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DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY’S
ATTEMPT TO TURN
POLITICS INTO LAW
CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER*
I
INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2001, President George W. Bush faced a difficult decision.
He needed to articulate his administration’s policy regarding federal funding of
medical research on embryonic stem cells.  A year earlier, the National Insti-
tutes of Health had announced guidelines to fund such research.  Upon entering
office, President Bush elected to review those guidelines and to make his own
determination of federal policy.  On August 9, 2001, he made his first prime-
time television address to announce his decision.
The period preceding the President’s decision drew as much attention as the
decision itself.  President Bush reportedly studied the problem with great care,
read and consulted with experts about the medical potential of such research
compared to research using adult stem cells, and heard from individuals and
groups concerned about the intentional destruction of human embryos as well
as from others convinced that the medical benefits of such research should not
be foregone.1  Several weeks before the President’s final decision, his Secretary
of Health and Human Services talked with Jim Lehrer of the nightly PBS news
program, the News Hour.
JIM LEHRER: In a general sense is the president making—in your opinion—is the
president making a scientific decision, or is he making a political decision?
TOMMY THOMPSON: I can assure you it’s not a political decision—it will be a sci-
entific and ethical decision that this president will make, will base his final decision on.
JIM LEHRER: But isn’t it basically weighing the whole element of when life begins
and anti-abortion ideas versus other things—all that it’s not a big—
TOMMY THOMPSON: It’s all of that and more.2
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2. The News Hour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast, July 12, 2001), available at
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“Political decision [-making]” in this exchange involves calculating the elec-
toral advantages or disadvantages to President Bush by figuring out who the
winners and losers of the decision to fund stem-cell research would be, and pre-
dicting how they would react.  As estimated by the public opinion polls con-
ducted at the time, more people supported federal funding than opposed it.3  A
politician’s benefit-loss calculation, however, takes account of more details than
these overall numbers.  The composition of the groups on either side of an issue
can matter a great deal.  In this case, right-to-life citizens strongly opposed such
funding, while medical researchers and persons standing to benefit from the
medical advances promised by stem cell research earnestly supported funding.
In looking over this breakdown, any adviser to President Bush could see that
the opposition included a crucial re-election constituency known to vote in high
percentages.  It would be costly to dampen their enthusiasm for making political
contributions, participating in get-out-the-vote efforts, and turning out to vote
themselves.  In contrast, the people committed enough to stem cell funding to
make it the basis for their vote were probably less numerous, as well as less
critical to the President’s re-election prospects, although only time would reveal
whether that prediction was accurate.
Secretary Thompson sought to dissuade Lehrer and his viewership from
thinking that such a political calculation would play any role in the stem cell re-
search decision.  Most Americans were probably not convinced.4  Polling or-
ganizations often ask citizens about their perceptions of the role electoral or
political considerations play in the choices their elected officials make.  The re-
sults show an overwhelming belief that elected officials are “out for them-
selves,” either by giving priority to electoral considerations or feathering their
own nests in other ways.  By a five-to-one ratio, for example, Americans think
members of Congress work to better themselves rather than the country.5 By a
61% to 32% margin, people think it is impossible for members to avoid being
influenced by the financial contributions that they receive when making policy
decisions.6 They believe that government decision-making is dominated by the
“special interests,” groups with the ability to contribute to campaigns in
amounts that individuals cannot match.7  Americans differentiate sharply be-
tween their own beliefs and those of special interests.  In one poll, 82% felt that
3. See infra notes 140-143 (describing the polling data).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 144-146.
5. In one poll, the response rates were 74% and 17%, respectively. Capitol Hill Watch: Congres-
sional Facts and Figures, NAT’L J., Mar. 15, 1997, at 524 (discussing a Feb. 1997 Fox News Opinion Dy-
namics poll).
6. Id.
7. When asked about the power of different groups influencing policy in Washington, people re-
spond that “big companies,” “political parties,” the “news media,” and “political lobbyists” exert too
much influence, by percentages ranging from 79% to 88%.  Louis Harris & Associates Poll, Nov. 10,
1994 (results on file with the author).
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“those we elect to Congress in Washington lose touch with the people pretty
quickly.”8 Only 16% disagreed.
Trust that government will work for the public good fluctuates in response
to world or national events.  In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, trust-in-
government figures have spiked upward.9  Even the post-September 11 level of
confidence was less than recorded in 1964,10 however, and a review of the data
over the past four decades reflects a decline in trust that began in the mid-1960s
and has persisted ever since.11  Just one in five said in 1994 that they trusted
Washington to “do what’s right” always or most of the time.  In 2000, the per-
centage saying this was up to 44%, a height not reached since President
Reagan’s first term, when many such measures showed an improvement.  These
numbers, however, are sharply lower than in 1958, when the comparable figure
was 73%, or than 1964, when it reached 76%.12
The public’s overall disposition toward Congress was expressed well by a
citizen participating in a focus group discussion about government:
Unfortunately, I think that Congress has reached a point now where . . . there are so
many special-interest groups that have bucks, and [members of Congress] are going to
work on taking care of them.  The people that make the most noise get the most atten-
tion, and those people have the money and the numbers to get it.13
The sense that our social and political system has a deficit of publicly minded
discourse and motivations is widely shared by academics as well as the general
public.  Instead of “we” talk, politics is dominated by “I” talk.  This reinforces
an increasingly “fragmented society . . . whose members find it harder and
harder to identify with their political society as a community.”14  Some observers
8. ABC News Poll, Apr. 8-9, 1992, reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, PUBLIC
OPINION OF CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 13, tbl.5 (Sept. 17, 1993).  John Hibbing and Elizabeth
Theiss-Morse report the same general statistical findings—86% state that special interest groups exert
too much influence—and the same disjunction between “special interests” and the general population.
Whereas close observers of politics are likely to see interest groups as vital links be-
tween the public and the government, helping to capture and to express the diversity of
the public’s views, the people themselves see the situation quite differently.  Interest
groups, they contend, are definitely not connected with ordinary people, even remotely.
Instead, the popular notion is that these special interests are completely divorced from
the public interest.
JOHN HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, CONGRESS AS THE PUBLIC ENEMY 63-64 (1995).
9. A commonly polled question asks, “how much of the time do you think you can trust the gov-
ernment in Washington to do what is right?”  A Washington Post-ABC News poll taken after the ter-
rorist attacks showed 64% responding either “just about always” or “most of the time” to this question.
Richard Morin & Claudia Deane, Poll: Americans’ Trust in Government Grows, available at
http://nationaljournal.com/members/polltrack/2001/national/01fedgovt.htm#30.
10. In 1964, 76% responded “just about always” or “most of the time” to the trust-in-government
question quoted supra note 9, compared to 64% after September 11, 2001.  The NES Guide to Public
Opinion and Electoral Behavior, National Election Studies, available at http://www.umich.edu/~nes/
nesguide/toptable/tab5a_1.htm (last visited May 7, 2002).
11. HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 8, at 32.
12. Trust in Government, 1958-2000, The NES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior,
available at http://www.umich.edu/~nes/nesguide/toptable/tab5a_1.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2001).
13. HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 8, at 65.
14. JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL 24 (1995).
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see in society a “narrow and often mean-spirited concentration on immediate
self-interest;”15 others diagnose the problem as a case of people “having interest
solely in [themselves], or at least failing to demonstrate sufficient regard for the
interests of others.”16  Individual self-interest and selfishness have led to identity
politics and special interest politics at the group level.  To capture both the indi-
vidual and collective phenomena, this paper will refer to partial interests, dis-
tinguishing the pursuit of partial interests from the pursuit of the public interest,
the common good, or public reason.
Much of contemporary political theory has been a reaction to the over-
pursuit of partial interests in the public arena.  In the realm of theory, this has
been expressed in a reaction to theories of political pluralism, which portray the
pursuit of partial interests as relatively benign, due to the fact that competing
partial interests can act as counterweights against each other, producing reason-
able public policy.17 A variety of alternatives to pluralism have flowered or have
been rediscovered, including communitarianism, the civil society movement,
civic republicanism, and deliberative democracy.  Each  shares the normative
claim that the influence of partial interests on public policy should be greatly
reduced, and, indeed, eliminated.  A prescriptive claim comes as a corollary: In-
dividuals should refrain from asserting their partial interests in the public fo-
rum.  In this way we avoid “[t]he danger that citizens advancing claims based on
interests may secure legislation that does not express a publicly justified claim,
but a sectarian or factional interest.”18
These reactions to the over-pursuit of partial interests have become overre-
actions.  The dangers of excessive influence of partial interests are real, but the
manner in which influential modern political theories attempt to extirpate that
influence raises serious problems of its own.  In developing this argument, this
article focuses on the approach that deliberative democracy has taken to partial
interests.19
The theory of deliberative democracy sketches a model of politics based on
models of law and legal decision-making.  It aspires to turn political decisions
into a form of legal decision-making.  It is easy to see how this ambition re-
sponds to the widespread belief that partial interests dictate public outcomes.
Among other things, it implies that the kind of electoral calculations sketched
15. WILLIAM SULLIVAN, RECONSTRUCTING PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 3 (1986).
16. AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 19 (1996).
17. See, e.g., FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BETH L. LEECH, BASIC INTERESTS: THE IMPORTANCE
OF GROUPS IN POLITICS AND IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 44-63 (1998) (summarizing the pluralism scholar-
ship and the difficulties it confronted).
18. GERALD GAUS, JUSTIFICATORY LIBERALISM 243 (1996).
19. Of all the contemporary competitors to political pluralism, deliberative democracy is exem-
plary in its candid acknowledging of the ineradicable plurality of viewpoints and perspectives in our so-
ciety.  It thus steers clear of the problematic homogenizing assumptions of civic republicanism or com-
munitarianism.  At the same time, deliberative democracy articulates a theory of politics in which plural
interests would be subordinated to the public good.  Much of this article’s criticism of deliberative de-
mocracy’s treatment of partial interests ought to be applicable, ceteris paribus, to theories that make
even less realistic assumptions.
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out above would be entirely out of bounds, and that a sound public decision
would be one based on science and ethics—science to predict the consequences
of possible decisions, and ethics to evaluate the relative merits of those conse-
quences.
This legalistic vision of politics leaves much out of account, portrays an un-
realistic and unattractive picture of politics, and is ultimately self-defeating, or
so this paper will argue.  Part II elaborates on deliberative democracy’s attempt
to displace politics with law. Part III exposes some of the difficulties with that
attempt.  Part IV returns to the impetus behind the attempt—deliberative de-
mocracy’s belief that comprehensive views and partial interests should play no
role in politics—and questions that belief.  The role of partial interests in influ-
encing particular political outcomes is and needs to remain endogenous to po-
litical practice itself.  Politics should thus bear less resemblance to law than the
deliberativists claim, and partial interests should rightly play a greater role in
political decisions than the deliberativists would prefer.
II
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND THE LEGAL MODEL
This Part draws out the elements of similarity between the model of political
reasoning in deliberative democratic theory and models of legal reasoning and
legal decision-making.  I believe that these elements are central to many differ-
ent versions of the deliberative theory, but am mindful of the fact that what de-
liberative democracy advocates espouse cannot be reduced to any simple set of
claims.20  Deliberative theory commands a large and growing audience, as well
as an ever-expanding literature, and with that growth comes a growing number
of internal disagreements.  To avoid a discussion based on stitched-together
pieces of diverse theories which form a composite endorsed by no one, this sec-
tion will rely heavily on the version of deliberative democracy developed in the
work of Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson.  Not only is theirs one of the
leading versions of deliberative theory, but other theorists adopt positions
similar to theirs, as the discussion and references will attest.21
The theory of deliberative democracy has been preoccupied with how
democratic societies ought to deal with the fact that citizens often bring to bear
20. For conceptions of deliberative democracy more minimalist than those discussed here, see
James Fearon, Deliberation as Discussion, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 44, 44-45 (Jon Elster ed.,
1998) (stating that deliberative democracy simply involves discussion before voting) [hereinafter Delib-
erative Democracy]; Susan Stokes, Pathologies of Deliberation in Deliberative Democracy, in
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra, at 123 (explaining that deliberative democracy involves discus-
sion and communication designed to change people’s preferences before voting).  For discussion of
some of the major themes in the deliberative democracy literature, see Samuel Freeman, Deliberative
Democracy: A Sympathetic Comment, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 371 (2000).
21. The characteristics sketched out in Part II of this paper show the presuppositions of delibera-
tive democracy that lead the theory to embrace the project of turning politics into law.  The criticisms
of that project remain generally applicable to variants of deliberative theory that do not share these
characteristics if those variants still embrace that project, because the major criticisms of the project do
not depend upon the motivations for adopting it.
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“conflicting perspectives on fundamental values” when debating what laws
should govern us all.  This question assumes central importance for deliberative
democrats because they assume that our society is characterized by a  “reason-
able pluralism.”22  Persons subscribe to a “diversity of reasonable comprehen-
sive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines found in modern democratic
societies,” a condition that “is not a mere historical [one] that may soon pass
away.”23  Scarcity, limited generosity, incompatible values, and incomplete un-
derstanding create “irreducibl[e] moral conflict in politics.”24
A reasonable pluralism of comprehensive views promises to generate dis-
agreement over government policies to such an extent that many of even “our
most important judgments [will] be made under conditions where it is not to be
expected that conscientious persons . . . will all arrive at the same conclusion.”25
Consequently, if any one of us is able to succeed in having his or her compre-
hensive view enacted into law, the result will be that the oppressive power of
the state will impose a policy on some citizens that they have not chosen, be-
cause it conflicts with their own system of beliefs and values.  While such a re-
sult accords with what we consider right and just, from the perspective of such
others our insisting on the result seems simply to “insist on [our] own beliefs
when [we] have the political power to do so.”26
When is the use of state power justifiable in the face of such reasonable dis-
agreement?  The commitment of deliberativists to the liberal principle of the
free and equal status of all individuals produces a distinctive answer.  If, “by na-
ture, every individual is free and equal to every other individual,” then there is
no essential difference between them that can justify the domination of one over
the other.27 Under that view, allowing inessential characteristics such as eco-
nomic or social position to determine political advantage could not be justified
22. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 36 (1996) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM].  See also Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in
DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE 96, 97 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996) (describing “the fact of reasonable
pluralism” as “the fact that there are distinct, incompatible understandings of value, each one reason-
able, to which people are drawn under favorable conditions for the exercise of their practical reason”);
Joshua Cohen, Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus, in THE IDEA OF DEMOCRACY 270, 281-82
(David Copp et al. eds., 1993) (“The idea of reasonable pluralism is that there are distinct understand-
ings of value, each of which is fully reasonable.  An understanding of value is fully reasonable just in
case its adherents are stably disposed to affirm it as they acquire new information and subject it to criti-
cal reflection.”).
23. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at 36.
24. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 25.  John Rawls explains the existence of reason-
able pluralism in a similar way.  People’s views are pluralistic because the relevant evidence is “con-
flicting and complex, and thus hard to assess and evaluate”; the weights to be assigned relevant factors
are not uniformly shared; critical concepts are “vague and subject to hard cases,” necessitating resort to
judgment and interpretation; people’s assessment of evidence and weighing of moral and political val-
ues are affected by their total life experiences, which differ; and normative considerations of different
force can point in opposite directions with respect to some issues, without any definitive method for
resolving which to follow.  RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at 56-58.
25. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at 58.
26. Id. at 61.
27. Bernard Manin, On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation, 15 POL. THEORY 338, 340 (1987).
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to each individual.28  In order to be justified, the use of political power ought
ideally to come from the free choices that individuals make.  For deliberativists,
the use of political power can be justified “if and only if [the decision] could be
the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals.”29  The conditions
under which such an agreement could be achieved exist if everyone accepts—or
could accept—a collective decision as justified.30  “Political decisions are collec-
tively binding, and they should therefore be justifiable, as far as possible, to
everyone bound by them.”31 Uses of political power should be choice-sensitive
and status-insensitive.
Deliberativists contend that collectively binding decisions cannot be justified
to free and equal individuals if they depend upon partial interests, comprehen-
sive religious views or other sorts of ultimate commitments that any individual
cannot accept, because deciding on such a basis denies equal status to each in-
dividual’s opinion and comprehensive view.  Thus, John Rawls states a conclu-
sion commonly reached by deliberativists:
[C]itizens as free and equal have an equal share in the corporate political and coercive
power of the society .  .  .  .  There is no reason, then, why any citizen, or association of
citizens, should have the right to use the state’s police power to decide constitutional
essentials or basic questions of justice as that person’s, or that association’s, compre-
hensive doctrine directs.32
The situation is rendered more complex by the fact that deliberativists concede
that some comprehensive views are reasonable, and hence not capable of being
ruled out of hand, “even though we could not seriously entertain them for our-
selves, as we think they give excessive weight to some values and fail to allow
for the significance of others.”33  Given this fact, some disagreements about how
to proceed collectively will simply prove intractable.34  So how can decisions be
made that are justifiable even to those who disagree with them?
Predictably, deliberativists argue that a particular type of deliberation ought
to take place.  An initial aim of deliberation is to achieve as much consensus as
possible, but deliberativists have already conceded that disagreement on the ac-
tual decision will often persist in an environment of reasonable pluralism.  Con-
ceding the practical impossibility of consensual or unanimous decision-making,
deliberative democrats shift their focus to examining how free and equal indi-
28. Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD POLITY 17, 19 (Alan
Hamlin & Philip Petit eds., 1989).  The modern locus classicus for this argument is JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
29. Cohen, supra note 28, at 21.
30. The distinction between actual and hypothetical consent can be significant, but not with respect
to any of the arguments developed here.
31. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 13.
32. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at 61-62.
33. Id. at 59-60.
34. See, e.g., Gerald Postema, Public Practical Reason: Political Practice, in THEORY AND
PRACTICE: NOMOS XXXVII 345, 355 (Ian Shapiro & Judith Wagner DeCew eds., 1995) (noting the
“challenge posed by the pervasive moral disagreement that seems characteristic of modern moral
communities, and the apparent impotence of debate to achieve reconciliation”).
SCHROEDER_FMT.DOC 08/01/02  1:42 PM
102 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 65: No. 3
viduals can achieve the most desirable kind of disagreement.35  Cut off from any
assurance of unanimity, deliberative democrats articulate a process of public
deliberation through which democratic decisions can be justified.
It is at this point that deliberativists’ heavy reliance on the model of law and
legal deliberation come clearly into view.36  Often the analogy is drawn quite
explicitly.  John Rawls, for example, takes the Supreme Court as the “exem-
plar” of the sort of “public reason” that ought to govern the public arena.37
Gutmann and Thompson also draw a direct parallel between the idealized deci-
sion-making of judicial actors 38 and the decision-making deliberative democracy
requires of political actors, rejecting the idea that pluralist interest-based bar-
gaining ought to typify the political arena.  They contend that
[d]eliberative democracy .  .  . calls into question the contrast between the principled
decisionmaking of courts and the prudential lawmaking of legislatures in which a
judge seeks to ‘give meaning to our constitutional values .  .  . perhaps even [is]
force[d] to be objective—not to express his preferences or personal beliefs, or those of
the citizenry, as to what is right or just[,] .  .  . [whereas] [l]egislatures .  .  . see their
primary function in terms of registering the actual, occurrent preferences of the peo-
ple—what they want and what they believe should be done.’  This contrast is problem-
atic both empirically and normatively.39
35. Gutmann and Thompson are explicit about this: “[Deliberation] is offered as the morally opti-
mal basis on which citizens who disagree about moralities and religions can act collectively. . . .  Recog-
nizing that politics cannot be purged of moral conflict, it seeks a common view on how citizens should
publicly deliberate when they fundamentally disagree.”  GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 67,
93.
36. What counts as legal deliberation or legal reasoning is itself no less heavily contested than what
counts as deliberative democracy.  Rather than articulate a full theory of legal reasoning, this paper
identifies three basic elements that it takes as central to most such theories.  See infra text accompany-
ing notes 44-68.
37. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 108-44 (James Boh-
man & William Rehg eds., 1997) [hereinafter Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason].  For Rawls, the scope
of public reason is limited to questions of justice as applied to “society’s basic structure of institutions,”
and thus would not extend to many issues debated in day-to-day politics.  Id. at 93.  See also RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at 214-15.  Many deliberative democrats, however, do not place
this limitation on the scope of public reason.  Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, for example, ar-
gue that their version of public reason extends beyond foundational principles to “the ongoing proc-
esses of everyday politics—in[to] middle democracy.”  GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 40.
“If moral arguments are essential to justify the foundations and results of democracy,” they ask, “why
should they also not be essential within the on-going processes of democracy?”  Id.  There are passages
in Rawls intimating that he is sympathetic to efforts to extend the jurisdiction of public reason to mid-
dle democracy, and he limits his discussion of it to basic questions of justice largely to take up first “the
strongest case where the political questions concern the most fundamental matters.  If we should not
honor the limits of public reason here, it would seem we need not honor them anywhere.  Should they
hold here, we can then proceed to other cases.  Still, I grant that it is usually highly desirable to settle
political questions by invoking the values of public reason.”  Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason, supra,
at 95.
38. “The fact that [the judicial deliberative] process is imperfect . . . is not thought to be a reason to
diminish the role of deliberation.  On the contrary, the failures of moral argument in the judicial proc-
ess are rightly thought to make the quest for successes all the more important.”  GUTMANN &
THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 45.
39. Id. (quoting Owen Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1979)).  See
also GAUS, supra note 18, at 263-67 (disputing as inaccurate the “bifurcation of legislative politics as
the arena of interests and judicial politics as the forum of principle . . . . Legislative politics not only can
be, but often [have] been, a fundamental part of the practice of liberal citizens to publicly justify their
principled demands on each other.”); STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES 113-17 (1991).
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Gerald Gaus also stresses the identity of law and what politics should aspire to
be.  He argues that the need to provide “public justification” for government
action leads to an “umpire account of political authority,” a “juridical” model of
“adjudicatory democracy” in which political decision-makers function as judges
to adjudicate conflicting claims in a manner that conforms to the “rule of law.”40
As part and parcel of the analogy between politics and law,41 deliberative
theory generates a set of expectations as to how political actors are to behave
that have direct parallels to the expectations of the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition
for the behavior of legal actors, although these expectations take shape within
distinctive institutional frameworks.  The most notable institutional distinction
between law and politics is law’s sharp separation of the functions of advocating
and judging, while politics allows the two functions to be performed by the
same individuals.  Our adversary system finds much merit in the distinctive and
separate functions of judge and advocate.  The legal system assigns overlapping
but not identical norms of conduct to persons who perform one function or the
other.  In contrast, our political system contains no separation of functions.
Elected officials, for example, frequently perform both roles.  The legalistic
conception of politics struggles with the internal tensions this produces.
The political problems created by combining advocacy and judging have
long been apparent.  No less an authority on American politics than Publius
highlighted the conflict between “competing parties [with] hostile pretensions”
and the “umpire or common judge” that ought ideally to be interposed between
them.42  The Federalist No. 10 frames the inherent conflict:
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly
bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.  With equal, nay with
greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time;
yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial de-
terminations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the
rights of large bodies of citizens?43
The Federalist No. 10 articulates the problem that deliberative theory attempts
to cure, namely the ability of partial interests to influence how the coercive
force of the state is used.  One way to solve this problem in politics might be to
draw a sharp distinction between the rulers and the ruled, but such a distinction
is democratically unacceptable.  Democracy, after all, is rule by the people—the
same people who petition the government for policy action are necessarily in-
volved in making the decisions.  Another approach might be to impose judge-
40. GAUS, supra note 18, at 195-214 (setting forth requirements for the just use of state power in a
chapter entitled “The Rule of Law”).
41. The affinity between deliberative democracy and the rule of law should not be surprising.  The
stress deliberativists place on the normative significance of choice by free and equal persons is a point
of emphasis shared with the liberal philosophical tradition of contractarian theories of politics.  Such
liberal theories “promise to decide a wide range of controversies fairly through decisions based on es-
tablished, known, impartially applied rules and procedures—to provide, in short, the rule of law.  The
very notion of government as originating in a ‘contract’ already gives liberal political theory a legalistic
cast.” ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 32-33 (1990).
42. THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, at 38 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
43. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 59.
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like obligations on those who participate in democratic decision-making.  This is
the chosen path for deliberative democrats.
To convert politics to law, deliberativists develop a model of political rea-
soning that adapts three central elements of legal reasoning and decision-
making.  The first element is that justice is blind.  Litigants stand before the
bench equal in the eyes of the law, in that their cases are to be judged by legal
standards that do not depend upon status, wealth, or political influence.  The
crowning achievement of the Anglo-American legal system in the seventeenth
century was making status-insensitivity a central ideal and commitment, one
that is often approximated in our legal system, albeit imperfectly.44  It is now
taken for granted that a system of law “ought to ignore the social status of indi-
viduals and also to ignore their political role, unless their ability to perform that
role itself requires some legal exemption.”45  In effect, “the legal system . . .
ought to be selectively blind and ignore irrelevant facts about people.”46
Deliberative democracy aspires to replicate this equality-creating blindness
in politics.  Individuals should have no advantages in the process of public de-
liberation by virtue of their wealth, social status, ability to mobilize electoral as-
sets, or capacity to provide rewards to other participants in the process.  In-
stead, what ought to count in the process of deliberation is the strength of the
arguments that an individual makes.
A second central element of law is its reliance on reasons.  Law aspires to
decision-making on the basis of reasoned argument.  Once the influences of
status and power have been outlawed, the remaining bases for decisions come
down to reason or random selection.  The law endorses reason over chance.  In
the judicial system, reasoned argument comes into play in two different ways.47
First, litigants advance their claims for relief by articulating reasons, orally and
in writing, that relief is warranted. Second, decision-makers make the decision
and then defend it publicly on the basis of reason.48
44. For a selective rendition of the story of this accomplishment, see DON HERZOG, HAPPY
SLAVES 110-47 (1989).
45. Id. at 132.
46. Id. at 126.
47. The deliberativists who explicitly invoke the law analogy for politics take multi-member ap-
pellate bodies, especially the Supreme Court, as their model.
48. Gutmann and Thompson insist that deliberation must be a shared social practice, and criticize
Rawls for espousing a more solitary understanding.
If [democratic citizens] are to weigh the interests of others and to guide their actions by a
sense of justice . . .  then democratic societies must encourage the give-and-take of moral ar-
gument about the substance of controversial political issues . . . Forums for deliberation
should abound. . . .  If we are to increase our chances of resolving our moral disagreements,
we must not check our deliberative dispositions at the door to the public forum.
GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 37-38.  Whatever the merits of the criticisms Gutmann and
Thompson make of Rawls on this score, those criticisms can only be directed at the early Rawls, the
Rawls of Theory of Justice,  and not at the later Political Liberalism Rawls.  As he develops the idea of
public reason in this and later work, Rawls describes a system in which citizens “offer one another”
public reasons for their views.”  Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason, supra note 37, at 116.  “The point of
the ideal of public reason,” he now writes, is to order the terms and conditions under which “citizens
are to conduct their fundamental discussions.” Id. at 104.
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In the hands of deliberativists, the element of reasoned argument generates
some stringent demands on political discourse.  One of these constrains people
to advance reasons that are sincere.  Arguments must not be advanced merely
for strategic purposes, as when a politician broadcasts allegations of disloyalty
or scandal against an opponent without believing the allegations to be true or
germane to the question of eligibility to serve in office.  Instead, for a delibera-
tive citizen to advance an argument, the argument must be one that she en-
dorses, as well as one that “would figure prominently amongst [her] reasons for
the proposal,” absent other considerations.49  Reasons advanced in public must
also be reasons that a citizen holds “for reasons of morality, not (only) for rea-
sons of political advantage.”50  This constraint on political participants is far
tougher than anything insisted on for lawyers, and in fact would be uncomforta-
bly confining for many advocates at law.  While lawyers are under obligations
not to deceive the court with respect to facts, we do not require them “to es-
pouse only [legal] positions [that they would continue to hold] independently of
the circumstances in which they speak.”51  To the contrary, lawyers are under an
obligation to their clients to advance the best arguments for their clients’ cases,
whether or not they would otherwise endorse such arguments.52
When sincere deliberation confronts an issue upon which consensus cannot
be reached, deliberators bear a further obligation related to the giving of rea-
sons: They bear an affirmative obligation to engage in “reiterated delibera-
tion.”53  As Gutmann and Thompson explain, “[r]eiterated deliberation encour-
ages public officials to learn from their mistakes and to correct them.  It enables
citizens to hold their representatives accountable for making better decisions in
the future.”54
The third element of the legal model that deliberativists adopt is the most
crucial.  “The heart of the law lies in its structure, in the way in which it makes
certain matters relevant, in the way in which it gives arguments relative impor-
tance.”55  When disputes move from unabridged public discussion into the
courtroom, the law imposes structure on them in terms of the arguments that
49. Postema, supra note 34, at 358.  The proviso is designed to cover cases of overdetermination.
The reason articulated need not be the one that actually motivates the speaker, so long as it would be a
motivating reason if no others presented themselves.  Id.  See also GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra
note 16, at 126 (“the constraint [of deliberative democracy] probably does rule out making arguments
that one would not accept if others made them.”).
50. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 81.
51. Id.
52. Of course, lawyers have as refined an ability to rationalize as anyone else, which often helps
them to believe the arguments they make for clients are the best ones, all things considered, to be ap-
plied to the case.  See Christopher H. Schroeder, Causes of the Recent Turn in Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 51 DUKE L. J. 307 (2001) (discussing the theory of motivated reasoning as applied to legal argu-
mentation).  It nonetheless remains the case that lawyers begin researching a client’s problem with a
view to finding the best arguments for that client’s position.
53. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 144.
54. Id.
55. Todd Rakoff, Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc. and the New Law of Regulatory Due Process,
1987 SUP. CT. REV. 157, 164 (1987).
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are considered relevant to the case.  The structure imposed is often itself the
object of dispute, as each of the opposing sides asserts “theories of the case”
that seek to impose a favorable structure on the dispute.  In Bush v. Gore, for
example, the theory of the case before the Florida Supreme Court was that the
Court could exercise its usual power of judicial review to interpret statutes con-
taining apparently conflicting rules about whether recounted ballots can, may,
or must be tabulated in the final vote. 56  This theory favored the Gore campaign.
On the other hand, the theory of the case might have been that the Florida leg-
islature exercised the exclusive authority vested in it under Article II of the
Constitution to provide for the selection of electors so as to take advantage of
federal law’s “safe harbor,” as the United States Supreme Court intimated it
should have been.  That theory of the case favored the Bush campaign.
In litigation, some of this structuring process goes on prior to trial in the
practice of dispositive and non-dispositive motions, such as motions for com-
plete or partial summary judgment; in appellate practice, however, the theory of
the case is articulated definitively only when the court announces its decision
and renders an opinion.  In the written opinion, the court states its conclusions
and articulates the reasoning justifying them.  The argument over the appropri-
ate theory of the case will itself have been structured, albeit loosely, by virtue of
the fact that only certain types of arguments are recognized as constitutional
and statutory arguments.57  What Governor Jeb Bush might have asserted in
press conferences to be the proper result, for instance, counts for nothing.
The relevance of facts is heavily determined by how the law structures a dis-
pute.  Those of us old enough to remember the trial of the Chicago Seven for
conspiracy to incite a riot at the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago will
recognize in that trial a dramatic illustration of law’s structuring effects.58  The
defendants disagreed over strategy.  Tom Hayden and others wanted to accept
the prosecution’s structuring of the case as an ordinary conspiracy trial and to
concentrate on exposing its weak factual points.  Others, including Jerry Rubin
and Abbie Hoffman, wanted to use the trial as a stage to attract other young
people to the anti-war movement by making statements about the war’s evil na-
ture and the federal government’s corrupt behavior in Vietnam.  Judge Julius
Hoffman considered the efforts of the defendants to pursue this second objec-
tive to be disruptive and irrelevant to the trial.  Judge Hoffman’s intemperate
efforts to keep the trial within the structure of the law of conspiracy—culmi-
nating in Bobby Seale sitting in the courtroom bound and gagged—ultimately
resulted in his removal from presiding in Seale’s subsequent trial on charges of
criminal contempt.  On the issue of relevancy, though, Judge Hoffman was cor-
56. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
57. For one typology, see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991).
58. For those of us not old enough to remember, some background is available on Doug Linder’s
Famous Trials web page, at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/Chicago7/chicago7.html
(last visited May 7, 2002).
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rect: The facts some of the defendants wished to introduce were irrelevant to
the structure the law of conspiracy imposed on their trial.
In the realm of political decision-making, deliberative theory imposes con-
siderable structure.  Arguments are to be limited to those that are publicly ac-
cessible, independent of a comprehensive view that others could reasonably re-
ject, and are not to be predicated on partial interests.59  Many deliberative
theories give a little ground on these constraints when addressing what is per-
missible at early stages in political deliberation.  Persons enjoy some liberty
early on to try out arguments founded on partial interests or excluded compre-
hensive views.  Gutmann and Thompson, for example, allow that “even ex-
treme nondeliberative methods [i.e., speech that does not satisfy the constraints
of deliberation] may be justified as necessary steps to deliberation.”60  Equally
clear, however, is that, prior to final decision, participants must filter out such
arguments.  As Rawls explains, “[such reasoning] may be introduced in public
deliberation at any time, provided that in due course public reasons, given by a
reasonable political conception, are presented sufficient to support whatever
the comprehensive doctrines are introduced to support.”61
Filtering can occur in the course of the deliberations, as the arguments
raised in public debate are subjected to critical scrutiny by others.  Counter-
arguments raised by co-deliberators may result in modifications to an original
stance, as one comes to see that it does not conform to the demands of public
reason.  Or, self-reflection and restraint may filter unacceptable reasons.  How-
ever the filtering is done, eventually “political debate [must be] organized
around alternative conceptions of the public good.”62  Proposals must be predi-
cated on principles and rationales that other citizens committed to finding
grounds for agreement could also endorse as a fair basis for cooperation.  Any
empirical claims upon which those proposals depend must flow from “relatively
reliable methods of inquiry.”63  By the end of the process, “proposals and the ra-
tionales for them must be both accessible to each member of the community and
assessable by each member.”64
Thus, deliberative democracy requires that each participant monitor and
scrutinize her own positions and arguments.  Arguments advanced in the public
arena as ultimate bases for public action must be ones the participant endorses,
relying only upon arguments and evidence that the participant sincerely be-
lieves could be adopted by all other participants sharing her commitment to the
public good.  Conclusions regarding public actions “should be reach[ed]
through reason rather than force, and more specifically, through reasoning
59. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
60. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 135.
61. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason, supra note 37, at 135.  This represents a revision of Rawls’
earlier views, which were more restrictive of what arguments could be advanced in public discussion.
Id.
62. Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, supra note 28, at 18.
63. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 55-56.
64. Postema, supra note 34, at 358-59.
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rather than self-interested bargaining.”65 A policy based on “the interests of
others” should not be imposed on anyone else.66  Any decision “based on the
private or idiosyncratic concerns of officials” is “arbitrary”67 and unjustifiable.
“[P]ublic explanations and justifications of laws and policies [must be made] in
terms of conceptions of the public good.”68
Public reason also imposes a requirement of generality on reasons and prin-
ciples.  Generality requires that, when a speaker or writer endorses an argu-
ment, she commits to its application in all other situations that are relevantly
similar.  Generality has a direct analogue in the legal model, where courts
should not advance rationales that are “good for this day and train only.”69  The
Court in Bush v. Gore wrote that “[o]ur consideration is limited to the present
circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes gener-
ally presents many complexities,” thereby at least hinting that its rationale
would have no further application. 70  If this is what that passage means, it trans-
gresses the normal expectations of judicial reasoning.  Deliberative rationales
and arguments in political reasoning are likewise expected to be general.71
Even when such “robustly public discourse”72 occurs, we already know that
agreement will not always be forthcoming—just as in law, judges can disagree
after both sides have been excellently briefed and superbly argued.  At this
point, though, the demands of public reasoning diverge from the legal model.
In law, judges who have deliberated and yet continue to disagree form them-
selves into majorities, pluralities, concurrences, and dissents.  In separate opin-
ions, judges develop the divergent reasoning of their separate positions.  Delib-
erative democracy is more demanding.  The mutual respect which each free and
equal individual owes to others implies that disagreeing deliberators are con-
strained to seek grounds for mutual accommodation.73  “Insofar as moral rea-
soning in politics succeeds in finding . . . principles [that can be justified on the
basis of mutually acceptable reasons], the conclusions of deliberation become
mutually justifiable.  Insofar as it fails, [deliberative democracy] continues to
make demands on citizens.  It prescribes accommodation based on mutual re-
spect.”74
65. Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Moral Conflict and Political Consensus, 101 ETHICS 64,
77 (1990).
66. GAUS, supra note 18, at 232.
67. Id. at 199.
68. Id. at 18.
69. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944).
70. 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000).
71. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 13.
72. Political discourse is robustly public “when reasonable people, mutually committed to this
project [of reaching agreement or consensus] and submitting to its discipline, engage together in ar-
ticulation, deliberation and argument about the structure and duty of their common life.”  Postema,
supra note 34, at 356.
73. Mutual respect is the attribute that makes the entire deliberative process work.  GUTMANN &
THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 79 (recognizing mutual respect as a “value . . . at the core of reciprocity
and deliberation in a democracy . . . mak[ing] possible cooperation on fair terms”).
74. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 56.
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The foregoing sketch brings out the manner in which the deliberative model
of politics adapts critical elements of the legal model.  Politics is to be blind to
economic status, class, and power.  Individuals participating in politics are to
endorse reasoned arguments that are general in scope, and to do so sincerely.
Reasons are not to be based on private interests, sectarian comprehensive
views, or factual claims resting on unreliable or inaccessible empirical methods.
Arguments are limited to those that others similarly committed to the project of
reaching fair terms of agreement could reasonably accept.  Public actions must
rest on such arguments and reasons.
These principles have somewhat different formulations in the work of dif-
ferent deliberativists, but the project of converting politics into law lies at the
heart of most of that work.  Deliberative theorists want the norms of delibera-
tion to constrain political reasoning in the same fashion as the analogous norms
imposed by law constrain legal reasoning.  The next section explores several
reasons why the practices of politics and law do not have the similarities in
structure that deliberative democracy wishes to create, and why the project of
turning politics into law runs aground on the differences between them.
III
THE VALUES OF NON-DELIBERATIVE PRACTICES
The ambition of deliberative democracy to structure or constrain politics
does not by itself distinguish deliberative theory from a number of other ap-
proaches to politics.  The character of the constraints deliberative democracy
seeks to impose does distinguish it, however.  Think of politics as a practice
comprised of inputs, decision processes, and outputs: Inputs consist of the pref-
erences and beliefs of participants; decision processes consist of the institutions
and practices that the participants employ, including practices that may trans-
form the inputs prior to final decision; and outputs consist of the decisions gen-
erated by those institutions and practices.  With this simple construct, delibera-
tive democracy can be distinguished from prominent alternative theories by
virtue of what aspects of the political system each seeks to structure.
Constitutionalism is one alternative to deliberative democracy.  Constitu-
tionalism structures the outputs of the political process by proscribing those
outputs that would violate protected rights.75  One of constitutionalism’s virtues
is that it envisions a practice that seems capable of actually being achieved, de-
pending upon the specific content of the protected rights.  America’s own soci-
ety, for instance, already counts non-discrimination, fair trials, and free speech
rights as well established legal constraints.  Criticism of our failures to protect
those rights in some circumstances carries a weight and seriousness that can ex-
75. E.g., GUTTMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 27 (“Constitutional democrats add another set
of rights to those that have priority over the democratic process, rights whose primary purposes is to
produce justified outcomes.”).
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ist only when something that is both desirable and achievable nonetheless re-
mains undone.
Other alternatives to deliberative democracy focus on ensuring that the in-
stitutions of government are not closed to any eligible political participants, and
that one citizen’s participation is no less effective than another’s.  These ap-
proaches are sometimes called process-based, proceduralist, or democracy-
reinforcing because they downplay the importance of regulating political out-
puts except insofar as those outputs attempt to distort the processes of majority
rule.76  Like constitutionalism, they also advance an ideal of politics that seems
capable of actually being achieved, depending upon the specific meaning one
gives to openness and effectiveness.
Deliberative democracy endorses a number of constitutionalism’s con-
straints on majority outcomes, as well as proceduralism’s efforts to ensure equal
access to democratic participation.  In the case of deliberative democracy, how-
ever, these constraints are generated by a normative structuring of the decision
processes politics that is much more elaborate and demanding than either con-
stitutionalism or proceduralism.  Deliberative democracy aspires to structure
the practices of “middle democracy”—”the ongoing practices of everyday poli-
tics.”77  Although deliberative democracy might thus be termed process-based,
its ambition to change the internal workings of daily political discourse by or-
chestrating the myriad activities that are internal to political institutions moves
it into a different category.  Once equal access and effectiveness have been met,
process-based theories treat majority decision-making as a black box, accepting
almost any result as legitimate.  In contrast, deliberative democracy microman-
ages what goes on inside the box, demanding that debate, dialogue, and deci-
sion-making satisfy deliberative norms.  Indeed, the demands of deliberation
placed on middle democracy are so onerous that there are good reasons to be-
lieve they cannot be achieved by human society as currently constituted78—as
deliberativists themselves concede. 79
The fact that no democracy could ever achieve all of deliberation’s demands
prompts a question as to how, if at all, deliberative democracy evaluates the
many democratic structures that might be achievable, when all of them fail the
ultimate deliberative test.  What, in other words, is its approach to evaluating
second best systems?  Related to this question is another: If the ideal described
by deliberative democracy is not a realistic goal, what are deliberative democ-
racy’s realistic prescriptions for flawed democracies—what, practically speak-
ing, should those of us interested in improving democracies be trying to do?
76. John Hart Ely’s theory is among the most prominent.  See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST (1981).
77. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 40.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 94–110.
79. E.g., GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 357 (“To be sure, [deliberative democracy’s]
highest ideals place demands that actual politics may never fulfill.”); Postema, supra note 34, at 356
(describing public deliberation as a regulative ideal); id. at 371 (“We are typically forced by circum-
stances to make decisions . . . on the basis of uncompleted deliberation.”).
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One possible answer to the first question is that deliberative democracy has
no theory of second best.  Hence, decisions made under conditions short of de-
liberation are neither justified nor legitimate according to the norms of that
theory.  At best, deliberative democracy would just have nothing to say when it
comes to comparative assessments of any present or realistically possible de-
mocracy, and would simply be agnostic about whether some other democratic
theory—one presumably inferior to deliberative democracy itself—provides
suitable measures for such an assessment.  At worst, deliberative democracy
would say that no system of government can be justified or legitimate according
to the best theory of democracy—deliberative theory—and, hence, the only re-
course is to abandon democratic forms in favor of other approaches to govern-
ance, ones that do not depend upon the idea of rule by the people for their justi-
fication and legitimacy.
No deliberativist I know ends up endorsing either of these conclusions.
Notwithstanding the inability of any actual democracy to meet the demands of
deliberation, Gutmann and Thompson think that flawed democracies can make
decisions that are legitimate and, to a degree, justifiable.  They claim that a “de-
cision is legitimate if it is made according to proper political procedures, but the
extent to which it is morally justifiable—how right or just it is—depends sub-
stantially on the extent to which it is made and enacted deliberatively.”80  Gut-
mann and Thompson do not define “proper political procedures,” but by con-
trasting such procedures with the conditions of deliberation, they seem to
announce that, even if the conditions of deliberation are not achievable, com-
pliance with proper political procedures might be.  For instance, proper political
procedures could mean something no more demanding than the procedures
that are regularly followed in making decisions.  Whether this or something
more exacting is what they have in mind, understanding proper political proce-
dures to be achievable makes it possible for non-deliberative democratic deci-
sions nevertheless to be legitimate.
While legitimacy can be achieved without full compliance with delibera-
tion’s demands, justification cannot—at least full justification cannot.  Because
justification depends upon meeting deliberation’s demands, and those demands
can never be met, no decision can be fully justified.  The passage quoted, how-
ever, does not paint a hopeless picture for justification, because it treats justifi-
cation as a matter of degree, of more or less.  How much more or less—”how
right or just”—depends on “the extent to which it is made and enacted delibera-
tively.”  In spatial terms, the image is of a continuum along which the justifi-
ability of a decision correlates with “the extent to which it is made” delibera-
tively.  “The closer the real conditions that precede the voting, and the conduct
that follows it, approximate the ideal conditions of [deliberation], the stronger
the moral justification for the policies that are voted into law.” 81
80. Gutmann & Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy is Different, 17 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 161,
179 (2000).
81. Id. at 179.
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This interpretation of justifiability supplies a standard for comparing any
two decision processes.  By determining which of two procedures more closely
approximates the deliberative ideal, one can determine which of the two is
more justifiable.82  This standard fails to distinguish justifiable from unjustifiable
decisions, but it does reveal something about Gutmann and Thompson’s under-
standing of the dividing line between justifiable and unjustifiable decisions.83  If
we imagined a continuum in which decisions were ranked based on their delib-
erativeness, with points further right being more deliberate than points to their
left, under Gutmann and Thompson’s theory the dividing point between justifi-
cation and lack of justification must be to the left of the right pole.  Otherwise,
it would be wrong to speak of the “extent” of justifiability, as Gutmann and
Thompson do.  Assume there were no space between the point at which partial
compliance with the demands of deliberation produced a partially justified deci-
sion and the right pole representing full deliberative compliance.  In that case,
decisions could be in only one of two states: either they would be at the right
pole, perfectly compliant and hence justified, or they would be to the left of it,
and unjustified.  But Gutmann and Thompson speak of a third state: more or
less justified.  To make sense of the passage, then, the deliberation/justification
continuum needs three regions.  Unjustified decisions start at the left pole and
continue up to some point intermediate between the poles, where a region of
partial and ascending justification begins.  The right pole itself is the third re-
gion, full justification, one that no realistic form of democratic decision-making
will reach.
This imagery of moving from less to more justified as one moves left to right
within the middle region hints at an answer to the question of what deliberative
democratic theory demands of existing democracies.  It demands ongoing ef-
forts to keep moving farther and farther to the right.  The conditions of delib-
eration function as a regulative ideal, which democracies should always strive to
approximate.84 “We can demand real social and political institutions to ap-
proximate” the ideal.85  Deliberative conditions should be satisfied “as far as
possible.”86 If institutions are not currently conducive to deliberation, “reci-
82. Actually scaling the degree of compliance with deliberation’s conditions presents substantial
conceptual problems, but they are not material to the current topic.
83. There are passages in DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT that are suggestive of criteria for
unjustifiability. The authors assert for instance, that “in the absence of robust deliberation in democ-
racy, citizens cannot even provisionally justify many controversial procedures and constitutional rights
to one another.”  GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 18.  Most often, though, they speak in
terms of relative justifiability and relative compliance with the conditions of deliberation.  Id.
84. Gerald Postema sets consensus as the regulative ideal, but Gutmann and Thompson posit as
society’s goal the entire panoply of deliberative requirements, including mutual accommodation when
consensus finding fails.  Compare Postema, supra note 34, at 356 with GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra
note 16, at 13.
85. Postema, supra note 34, at 360.
86. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 13.  See also Gutmann & Thompson, Why Delib-
erative Democracy is Different, supra note 80, at 175 (“Deliberative democrats . . . are committed, and
not just provisionally, to mutually justifiable ways of judging the distribution of power.”).
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procity prescribes institutional change.”87 If deliberative institutions exist, but
individuals do not employ them, then individuals should be urged to comply
with the conditions of deliberation more fully in order to achieve closer ap-
proximation and, hence, a better system of governance.88  Deliberative democ-
racy urges that we should press forward along the deliberative continuum, al-
ways striving to move from less deliberation to more. 89
This picture of deliberative democracy must confront a serious issue, one
that it shares with any theory committed to single, unattainable normative ob-
jective.  Pursuing deliberative democracy’s objective of more and more delib-
eration will consume more and more of society’s resources, drawing those re-
sources away from the pursuit of other values that are themselves highly valued.
Because deliberation cannot ever be fully achieved, the call to pursue ever more
deliberative decision-making processes will be relentless.  How does delibera-
tive democracy justify the demand it places on citizens?  To date, the delibera-
tive literature fails to engage with, let alone justify, the costs of deliberation.
An initial reason to question investing in deliberation is that imperfect de-
liberation—the only kind there will ever be—can backfire.  One of the sup-
posed advantages of deliberation is that it improves people’s knowledge,
thereby leading to better decisions.  Unfortunately, all deliberation can guaran-
tee is an increase in people’s information, which is not the same thing as better
decisions.  Knowledge is that subset of information that produces better deci-
sions.90 Information, on the other hand, is a broader category, encompassing
“facts” that are bad or false, as well as good or true.91 If people cannot distin-
guish between bad or false information acquired through deliberation and
knowledge acquired through deliberation, then increased deliberation can lead
to poorer decisions.  Even acquiring information that is simply neutral with re-
spect to improving decisions by leaving predictions just as accurate, no more
nor less, than they were before the information was acquired, wastes the re-
sources expended to acquire it.  To the extent that deliberation contributes in-
formation but not knowledge, more deliberation will leave us worse off than we
87. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 73.
88. Gutmann & Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy is Different, supra note 80, at 179.
89. Whether more deliberation always equates with more moral justification has been challenged,
but exploring that line of inquiry is beyond the scope of this article.  See, e.g., Lynn M. Sanders, Against
Deliberation, 25 POL. THEORY 347, 369-70 (1997) (“Deliberation . . . has pernicious consequences, to
the extent that it is distracting from more basic problems of inclusion and mutual recognition, and to
the extent that it favors a form of expression and discourse that makes it likely that the talk of an iden-
tifiable and privileged sector of the American public will dominate public dialogue.”).
90. ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA 24-25 (1998)
(“We define knowledge as the ability to make accurate predictions. . . .  Note that having information
and having knowledge are not the same thing.  Knowledge is the ability to make accurate predictions;
information is data.  Knowledge requires information . . . [b]y contrast, you can know a long list of facts
and fail to put them together in a way that allows you to make accurate predictions.  Thus, although
you cannot have knowledge without having information, you can have information without having
knowledge.”).
91. Id. at 29 (“[I]nformation can actually be harmful . . . information is valuable only when it pre-
vents costly mistakes.”).
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were before, whether by decreasing the quality of decisions or consuming re-
sources without any deliberative return.
Here are two examples of deliberative exchanges of information that can
lead to costly mistakes.  First, information about the (ill-founded) opinion of
others can sometimes trigger an (unreliable) information cascade.  Such cas-
cades occur when information regarding the perceptions or beliefs of others
causes individuals to adopt the same perceptions or beliefs, thereby “trig-
ger[ing] chains of individual responses that make these perceptions appear in-
creasingly plausible through their rising availability in public discourse,” even
though nothing has happened to change an anticipated event’s probabilities.92
Information exchanged in a deliberative process can also lead to group polariza-
tion, due to a propensity of like-minded people sometimes to gravitate toward
the extremes in a discussion instead of toward the median.  Group polarization
presents the possibility that “like-minded people engaged in discussion with one
another may lead each other in the direction of error and falsehood.” 93  Still
more deliberation might cure deliberative problems such as these, but the fact
that pure deliberation will seldom if ever be achieved means that the risk of
such deliberative errors going uncured is real.
These costs of error and wasted resources are real, but they pale in compari-
son to the direct opportunity costs of deliberation.  So long as people continue
to disagree about public policies, deliberation will consume large quantities of
time and resources.  Under deliberative theory, ideas about public policies are
not simply to be presented publicly, they are to be tested in the public forum.
People must present arguments, listen to counter-arguments and claims, and
marshal and transmit rebuttal arguments in the public arena.  Deliberators on
controversial topics must recognize that any dialogic engagement reaches con-
clusions that are only tentative and provisional.94  For such topics, the delibera-
tive norm is not a single deliberation, but a series of “reiterated deliberations.”95
The demands of deliberation extend to all of the significant policy decisions a
society has to make.  Given the scope of governmental authority and the mani-
fold ways questions can be formulated, refined, and subdivided, the number of
such decisions will be practically limitless.  Deliberative fora and institutions
must also be designed for all levels of government—federal, state, and local.
Deliberative agendas will have to be constructed somehow, because it will
prove impossible to deliberate on every decision simultaneously.  Agenda-
setting itself will have to be the subject of deliberation.  Tough issues—the sub-
jects of reiterated deliberation—will be queuing up to re-enter the agenda as
soon as they are tentatively and provisionally resolved, competing for agenda
space with other issues.
92. Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV.
683, 685 (1999).
93. Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?: Why Groups Go To Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 118
(2001).
94. Gutmann & Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy is Different, supra note 80, at 176.
95. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 144.
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The law, upon which deliberative theory draws for its conceptual model of
politics, can provide some insights into the resource-consumptive nature of the
deliberation the theory wants to infuse into political decision-making.  What we
learn from law is not terribly encouraging for deliberative politics, because le-
gal decision-making is enormously resource-consumptive.  The Supreme Court,
considered the exemplar of public deliberation for a number of deliberativists,
currently decides only about eighty cases a year.  To handle this workload, each
of the nine justices employs four full-time clerks, who are supported by secre-
taries, docket-room personnel, library staff, and other employees many times
more numerous.  Doing the work involved in selecting and deciding the eighty
cases is a full-time job for the entire crowd.  The litigants that advance the ar-
guments which form the backbone of the Court’s deliberations have themselves
spent thousands and sometimes tens of thousands of person-hours bringing
their cases forward.  Significant as they are, these Supreme Court costs are but
the tip of the iceberg for the legal system as a whole.
Indeed, many legal disputes are scarcely deliberated at all.  Sometimes one
side stops deliberating precisely because she no longer thinks the expenditure of
resources can be justified.  Sometimes the appellate court concludes that the
case is not worth its time and dismisses the appeal summarily.  Even more
bracing for the ambitions of deliberative theory, many more disputes are not
deliberated at all.  The criminal justice system would grind to a halt if every
prosecution proceeded to trial.  Ninety to ninety-five percent of civil cases settle
before they get to trial.  (Settlements short of trial might be deliberatively justi-
fiable, but only if the parties involved have fully examined each other’s argu-
ments, and the settlement does not reflect the influence of economic pressures,
in at least a preliminary manner, but these conditions are often unmet.)
Translating knowledge about the time and resource implications of legal de-
liberation to the political arena cannot be done with any precision, but several
features of the context within which political deliberation takes place suggest it
could be even more resource-consumptive than legal deliberation.  For one
thing, as costly as it is, legal deliberation (and settlements) benefits from the
fact that law narrows the scope of the issues involved in a case and the parties
relevant to the dispute’s resolution.  The paradigm lawsuit is bipolar and raises
a small number of contested issues.  In contrast, most political disputes are
polycentric, implicating many parties and many issues, which criss-cross among
the parties in different ways. This makes political settlements that are accept-
able on deliberative grounds harder to achieve than legal settlements, and it
makes full deliberations complicated and time-consuming.  On each and every
issue, arguments will have to be marshaled and counter-arguments responded
to in a process that gives every deliberator ample opportunity to present and lis-
ten to views.
The foregoing suggests that individuals would have to invest massive re-
sources to satisfy the demands of deliberation, yet no deliberative theorist has
paid any attention to the costs and tradeoffs involved.  The theory’s oblivious-
SCHROEDER_FMT.DOC 08/01/02  1:42 PM
116 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 65: No. 3
ness to costs seems particularly odd given the spatial imagery that is implicit in
the theory.  Progress in democratic justifiability is conceptualized as coming in
degrees, step by step, as society engages in more and more deliberation.96  That
imagery almost unavoidably invites one to ask if the next step along the contin-
uum is worth its costs.  After all, what is at stake within the middle region is not
the dramatic distinction between unjustified and justified decisions, but rather
the more quotidian difference between a partially justified decision and a more
partially justified one, even one that is perhaps merely a small bit more justified
than the first.97  This marginal thinking about gains invites, it seems to me, simi-
lar marginal thinking about costs—and about whether one is worth the other.
Once one acknowledges the presence and relevance of costs to deliberation,
whether further moves along the continuum are themselves justifiable will de-
pend upon one’s theory of value.  One set of perspectives would approach such
matters through a utilitarian lens, looking to individual and aggregate utility
functions as their guide.  Within such a paradigm, whether deliberation ought to
be pursued depends upon whether it is utility-maximizing.  Gutmann and
Thompson, however, think utilitarianism is inadequate as a theory of value. 98
Even if one is not utility-maximizing, individuals who are being asked to delib-
erate confront some alternative and valued pursuits that cannot just be ignored.
Private pursuits, including those associated with family, work, and leisure,
will compete for the resources of deliberative citizens.  We live in a time in
which human flourishing is intimately associated with activities of private life,
including family, relationships, career, and the pursuit of life projects.  The
value in these aspects of ordinary life constitutes one of the hallmarks of mod-
ernity.99  Modernity is thus distinguishable from earlier traditions such as Aristo-
telianism, where participation as a citizen in the polity occupied a hierarchically
superior moral position to the activities of ordinary life.  In contrast, modernity
has experienced a transition “which upsets [this Aristotelian hierarchy], which
displaces the locus of the good life from some special range of higher activities
and places it within ‘life’ itself.  The full human life is now defined in terms of
labour and production, on the one hand, and marriage and family life, on the
other.  At the same time, the previous ‘higher’ activities come under vigorous
criticism.”100
Elevation of the values of ordinary life has substantive political implications,
such as underwriting a heightened sense of the importance of justice and free-
dom, conditions of social life vital to the full enjoyment of the ordinary.  It also
96. See supra text accompanying notes 80-89.
97. The dramatic improvement in going from unjustified to justified might deflect attention from
the price to be paid for the improvement, but in principle it would not remove the question whether
that move were worth the cost.
98. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 165-98.
99. See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF 211-13 (1989) (describing the “ordinary life” as
“those aspects of human life concerned with production and reproduction, that is, labour, the making of
the things needed for life, and our life as sexual beings, including marriage and the family”).
100. Id. at 213.
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has implications for political process, by making it impossible to take for
granted that the demands of public life ought invariably to take precedence
over the private.101  At some point well short of all public decisions being fully
deliberated, the pursuit of the private may justifiably take precedence over
public deliberation.
Even if deliberativists could defend the view that citizens ought to make all
the sacrifices necessary to keep moving along the deliberative continuum to-
ward the ideal—and I do not know how that argument would proceed—they
would face a further formidable obstacle.  Deliberativists must persuade and
thereby motivate citizens themselves to undertake the demands of deliberation.
It is not enough to win an argument in the graduate seminar room—it also must
be won in kitchens, soccer fields, and workplaces.
One version of this point is quite familiar to anyone with a passing acquain-
tance with law and economics or positive political theory: Any theory of human
action that involves choice must take into account the incentives and disincen-
tives associated with those choices.  The point was driven home in an article
which proved seminal in both of these sub-disciplines.  In a 1971 essay, George
Stigler noted the then-prevalent tendency of students of regulatory policy to
analyze the efficiency properties of regulated markets, to make recommenda-
tions for regulatory reform, and then to decry the failure of the regulators to
implement their recommendations.102  Stigler argued that this “idealistic view”
of “preach[ing] to the commissioners or to the people who appoint the commis-
sioners” is bound to fail to produce the desired results, because it ignores “the
basic logic of political life.”103  The ICC, for instance, is no more likely to re-
spond to criticisms of its allegedly pro-railroad policies than is the Great Atlan-
tic and Pacific Tea Company likely to respond to criticism that it sells grocer-
ies.104  In both situations, what we observe are individuals responding to
incentives and pursuing the interests that motivate them most.  Regulators re-
spond to pressures and incentives offered by members of an industry that sup-
ports policies favoring industry over the consumer, rather than to protestations
about the ideal of efficiency, because there are neither pressures nor incentives
from the efficiency corner comparable to those offered up by industry.
101. Not everyone applauds the displacement of the Aristotelianism system.  Modern human beings
have been described as “depoliticized . . . beings who are totally immersed in private concerns, [devoted
to a life of] lavish consumption.”  The result is “stunted individuals who have embraced lives emptied
of political responsibility [in which] the human ties that supply life with a bottomless fund of interpret-
able experience [have been] deliberately snapped.”  SHELDON S. WOLIN, TOCQUEVILLE BETWEEN
TWO WORLDS: THE MAKING OF A POLITICAL AND THEORETICAL LIFE (2001), quoted in Stephen
Holmes, Both Sides Now, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 4 & 11, 2002, at 31, 32.  It is also fair to note,
however, that “[b]y asserting . . . that a political utopia has been ‘lost,’ Wolin might make readers be-
lieve that it once existed.  But he will not tell us when and where . . . .” Holmes, supra, at 32.
102. George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 1 BELL J. OF ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 1
(1971), reprinted in CHICAGO STUDIES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 209, 225-28 (George Stigler ed., 1988).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 228.
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In light of the success of law and economics and positive political theory, it
perhaps just states the obvious to point out that incentives affect the likelihood
that the demands of deliberation can be met.  Yet the notion that individuals
face conflicting values that will draw them away from deliberative pursuits has
further, less obvious significance as well.  Political theory aimed at articulating
ideals that we should try to implement in our actual practice must necessarily
persuade in theory and in practice.105  It must persuade that the type of society it
contemplates embodies attractive features, giving adequate attention to justice,
equality, human freedom, and the like, and promising an environment condu-
cive to human flourishing.  Beyond this, it must also persuade the people whose
voluntary behavior is necessary to establish and perpetuate the institutions and
roles contemplated by the theory.  What can be missed is that these two mo-
ments of persuasion interact.  “If real people find it psychologically impossible
to live as the theory requires, or to adopt the relevant institutions, that should
carry some weight against the ideal.”106  Victory in kitchens, soccer fields and
workplaces affects victory in the graduate seminar, because the feasibility of an
ideal is a consideration in evaluating its merits for real people, as opposed to an
ideal for materially different beings.  Political theories that try to perform a pre-
scriptive task rather than a purely idealistic or purely descriptive task bear the
burden of convincing us that what they want done is sufficiently within the
grasp of the people who must do it that it, or something approximating it, might
actually be possible.  In this approach, the reactions of individuals to the call to
action has implications for theory as well as for practice.
In the case of individuals choosing between deliberative and private pur-
suits, while there is good evidence that citizens will invest some resources in
participating in public affairs, that evidence comes nowhere near suggesting
they will invest resources of the magnitude deliberative theory demands.107  The
behavior necessary to satisfy the demands of deliberation stands quite outside
anything that can be achieved, just as deliberative theorists concede.  While
conceding this reality, though, they ignore its implications.  It is worth a mo-
ment to reflect on both the reality and the implications.
Consider that politics as currently practiced in the United States is already
vibrant with opportunities to participate in events that contribute to delibera-
tive objectives.  For instance, my church recently held an information and dis-
cussion session on an upcoming county bond referendum, which would provide
monies for necessary capital improvements to the city’s school system.  My con-
gregation is fortunate to include one of the individuals elected to our Board of
Education.  She gave an extremely knowledgeable and informed presentation,
including a fair representation of the reasons some people were opposed to the
measure.  Of a congregation of 250, twelve people attended.
105. Thomas Nagel, What Makes a Political Theory Utopian?, 56 SOC. RES. 903, 903-04 (1989).
106. Id. at 904.
107. See supra notes 109-111 and accompanying text.
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And so it goes throughout political life.  We are awash in public meetings
and other opportunities to discuss public issues, but the ample opportunities to
engage in deliberative activities are poorly attended.  Even if they were better
attended, engaging in such activities would only accomplish part of the delibera-
tion upon which deliberativists insist.  Deliberative citizens have an obligation
to carry their views to other citizens and to allow them to be tested by listening
and being receptive to counter-arguments and evidence.  The incentives to par-
ticipate fully in such experiences are not great.
Deliberativists who hold onto the project of turning politics into law would
gain much by turning again to the legal model as a source of information about
how to achieve the demands of deliberation.  Importantly, the dissimilarities be-
tween the two decision-making environments create enormously different in-
centives.  The classical Anglo-Saxon model of the legal system unites desired
behavior and the motivation to invest in that behavior much more effectively
than politics does.  As already noted, the adversary system separates the role of
judge and advocate.  It then pays individuals to make judging their job, which
they retain by avoiding obvious conflicts of interest and displays of bias, and in
which they gain recognition and peer respect by treating litigants with respect
and considering their arguments attentively.  The system pays others to be ad-
vocates, tying their remuneration and success to hard work in advancing the
best arguments possible for their clients.  For neither judge nor advocate is the
alignment of desired function and incentive perfect, but it is an alignment
enormously superior to the alignment of the demands of deliberation in politi-
cal life to the various and diverse incentives given citizens.
This argument does not rely upon any of the gloomy conclusions reached by
rational actor models of behavior, which presume individuals to be motivated
solely by narrow self-interest.  Much empirical research has shown that it is
more realistic to posit that individuals respond to incentives and pressures
based on a variety of values, including self-regard, regard for others, and con-
cern for decision-making processes.108 Combined with innovative theorizing, this
research has produced improvements and revisions to narrow rational actor
models.  Even under such improved models, however, the result of the analysis
does not change. Rather than providing a basis to think that people could come
to desire the rewards of full deliberation more than any others, these models
shed further light on why total commitment to public pursuits is completely un-
likely.
One example of an improved model is Howard Margolis’ dual utility ap-
proach, in which human beings have preferences both for partial interests and
108. Students of behavioral economics have taken the lead in empirical work showing the influences
of values other than purely self-regarding ones.  For introductions into the literature, see John O. Le-
dyard, Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research, in THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL
ECONOMICS 111 (John A. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995); Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Fairness
and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 159 (Summer 2000); Matthew
Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 1291 (1993).
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public interests. 109  Margolis hypothesizes that the trade-offs between these two
sets of preferences are governed by two plausible rules. The first is that, ceteris
paribus, the more social utility that can be acquired with a marginal dollar com-
pared to the private utility that could be gained with that dollar, the more likely
someone is to engage in public interest behavior.  Individuals, hence, are more
likely to respond with public-regarding behavior when the private gain foregone
is small relative to the public gain. This is the value ratio rule.  The second rule
is that, ceteris paribus, the larger the ratio of one’s public interest spending al-
ready compared to one’s private spending, the less likely the person is to engage
in more public interest spending.  Individuals who have already done a lot in the
public sphere may conclude that they have done their fair share.  This is the
participation ratio rule. 110
Margolis’ two-utility theory suggests that individuals will engage in public-
spirited behavior when they are asked to do just a few simple deeds, because
the participation ratio for many people will then be low and the value ratio rela-
tively high, in so far as they will not forego much private satisfaction if the
deeds are simple.  In this way, the model can explain why people vote, why they
occasionally write to an elected official, and why they send modest amounts to
political parties or interest groups.  In this regard, the theory is an improvement
over the standard rational actor models, which have difficulty explaining activi-
ties like voting in a straightforward way.
As public behavior becomes costly relative to private gains, and as the pub-
lic forum asks for more and more resources, the participation ratio climbs and
the value ratio falls.  The result is less and less additional individual commit-
ment to public-spirited acts.  This combination—high participation ratio and
low value ratio—characterizes the demands of deliberation.  Even Margolis’
more realistic and less gloomy model will predict that individuals will at some
point choose not to commit further resources to deliberation.  In the absence of
some empirical evidence that demonstrates that people will engage in very
costly public interest behavior of the sort deliberativists demand, on a regular
basis, the burden would seem to be on deliberativists to demonstrate that what
they advocate by way of deliberative activity is plausible in light of people’s mo-
tivations, even assuming them to be partially public-regarding in nature.
The opportunity costs of deliberation have yet to be accounted for by delib-
erative theorists, and those costs alone undermine the attractiveness of the the-
ory.  In any situation of less-than-ideal conditions, furthermore, deliberative
theory faces the further problem that deliberators would have to achieve a men-
tal state quite different from the one with which we approach most information-
gathering and processing situations—and therefore quite difficult to achieve.
109. See, e.g., HOWARD MARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM AND RATIONALITY: A THEORY OF
SOCIAL CHOICE (1984).  Margolis’s dual utility theory is summarized in Howard Margolis, Dual Utili-
ties and Rational Choice, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 239 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990) [hereinafter
Margolis, Dual Utlities].
110. Margolis, Dual Utilities, supra note 109, at 240.
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Deliberativists argue that the mutual respect we owe others who commit to
the enterprise of finding shared ground for cooperation calls for the virtue of
open-mindedness, a “disposition [that] maintains the possibility that citizens can
be convinced of the moral merits of their adversaries’ position.”111  This is a dif-
ficult disposition for any of us to achieve.  Cognitive research suggests that hu-
man beings normally exhibit a good deal of “cognitive inertia” with respect to
theories we hold about the world.  A considerable body of work also reports a
confirmation bias, a tendency to seek confirmatory rather than disconfirmatory
information.112
Cognitive inertia and confirmation bias explain the observed tendency to
sort out arguments and evidence so as to privilege those that confirm our pres-
ent beliefs.  The theory of motivated reasoning has been offered as a way to un-
derstand how this sorting out process works.  The theory of motivated reason-
ing builds on the hypothesis that we formulate favorable or unfavorable
judgments about objects of our attention that are subsequently stored in our
memories as an evaluative or affective “tag.”113  It appears that the “very same
mechanism that brings thoughts into consideration also carries the affective
coloration of these thoughts to mind.”114
This suggests that many of our reasoning activities are “hot”—influenced in
important ways by the tags that accompany our beliefs.  In particular, when
someone has “a wish, desire, or preference that concerns the outcome of a given
reasoning task,” this motivation “may affect reasoning through reliance on a bi-
ased set of cognitive processes: strategies for accessing, constructing, and evalu-
ating beliefs” by providing a “directional goal” for her reasoning processes.115
That directional goal influences the results of the reasoning process because at
any one time we do not draw on our entire supply of beliefs, techniques, and
rules.  Instead, when confronted with a problem about which we wish to delib-
erate, we draw on a subset of them.116  “[P]eople access different beliefs and
rules on different occasions: they endorse different attitudes . . . express differ-
ent self-concepts . . . make different social judgments . . . and use different sta-
tistical rules.”117 Our directional goals are among the conditions that can influ-
ence the beliefs, rules, and evaluations that people employ and find
persuasive.118
111. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 83.
112. See David Good, Individuals, Interpersonal Relations, Trust, in TRUST (Diego Gambetta ed.,
1988) (summarizing some of the significant studies).
113. See, e.g., Milton Lodge & Charles Taber, Three Steps Toward a Theory of Motivated Reasoning,
in ELEMENTS OF REASON: COGNITION, CHOICE AND THE BOUNDS OF RATIONALITY 183-86 (Arthur
Lupia et al. eds., 2000) (describing theory of cognition in which all social concepts are effect-laden, and
in which the effect associated with social concepts is “stored directly with the concept in long term
memory”).
114. Id. at 196.
115. Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCH. BULL. 480, 480 (1990).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 483.
118. Id.
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A growing body of evidence supports these conclusions.119  For instance, in
one study, women who were heavy caffeine consumers were less convinced by
the evidence in an article claiming that caffeine posed risks for women than
were women who were low consumers of caffeine.120  Men, who had no direc-
tional goal with respect to the evaluation of the study, showed no such differen-
tial effects.121 Similarly, persons who endorsed the viewpoint that capital pun-
ishment deters crime were more likely to criticize a disconfirming study on the
basis of such reasons as “insufficient sample size, nonrandom sample selection,
or absence of control for important variables” than were those who already be-
lieved that capital punishment was not a deterrent.122  It seems that we “are
more likely to arrive at those conclusions that [we] want to arrive at.”123
This research has led some to conclude that we are “biased reasoners, find-
ing it nearly impossible to evaluate any new information in an even-handed
way.”124 Even if this strongly worded conclusion overreaches, at the very least
this research makes it clear that the open-mindedness deliberativists insist upon
will not be easily achieved.  Gutmann and Thompson are more alert to these
difficulties internal to the way people reason than they are to the competing
costs of engaging in deliberative activity.  They note that maintaining an open
mind when one already has convictions is a “delicate balance,” and one that “is
no doubt psychologically as well as intellectually demanding.”125 Rather than
wrestle with how these demands might be met, though, they simply urge that
people should try to change the way they think to accommodate deliberation,
because “the personal and political dangers of a simpler path . . . are greater.”126
This hortatory claim, however, is remarkably similar to the exhortations of
regulatory economists pre-Stigler.127  Simply telling individuals what they should
do will have little impact on actual behavior until incentives and motivations are
aligned with the better course of action.  Cognitive research adds to the prob-
lems of deliberative theory by showing us how difficult human beings would
find sustaining the kind of deliberative stance demanded.  This only exacerbates
the implausibility of coming close to satisfying the demands of deliberation.
The problem of countervailing costs poses a serious obstacle to the practical
attainment of the deliberative ideal.  That problem proves the undoing of delib-
erative democracy’s theoretical project—losing the argument in kitchens, work
119. See ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION 212-35 (1999) (summarizing evidence for the superior-
ity of motivated reasoning theory over a purely cognitive account of reasoning).
120. Ziva Kunda, Motivation and Inference: Self-serving Generation and Evaluation of Evidence, 53
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 636 (1987)
121. Id.
122. Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, supra note 115, at 490 (citing C.G. Lord et al., Bi-
ased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered
Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 2098 (1979)).
123. Id. at 495.
124. Lodge & Taber, supra note 113, at 184.
125. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 84.
126. Id.
127. See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
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places, and soccer fields means it loses in the seminar room, too.  We have been
critiquing the ambition of deliberative theory to structure politics so that it re-
sembles law. In that ambition, deliberative theory seeks to be for politics what
politics, in turn, is for law.  Law ultimately depends upon and is subordinate to
politics in that political decisions establish or sustain the structure of  law, which
the legal system then applies to individual cases.128  The politics involved could
be “higher lawmaking,” characteristic of constitution-drafting and constitu-
tional moments amending the fundamental law, or it could be normal lawmak-
ing, characteristic of normal statutory enactment.  In either case, politics makes
vital decisions that are pre-legal, since decisions are prior to and significantly re-
sponsible for the structure that the law subsequently imposes.
Stanley Fish has described deliberative democracy’s project as an attempt
“to replace large P Politics—the clash between fundamentally incompatible vi-
sions and agendas—with small p politics—the adjustment through procedural
rules of small differences within a field from which the large substantive differ-
ences have been banished.”129  By reducing politics to law-like disputes within a
field sharply structured by the demands of deliberation, deliberative theory
wants legal theory to order politics in the same way that politics orders law.
The problem is that theory qua theory does not and cannot have this relation-
ship to politics.  The structure that deliberativists seek to impose is one that can
only be adopted by political actors as they engage in political practice.  This is
unlike the structure that politics imposes on the practice of law, where people
engaged in legal practice come to it with its basic political structure in place.  No
institution or practice stands similarly prior to politics to impose the structure
on politics that deliberativists seek.  Deliberativists attempt to take out of po-
litical practice decisions that must necessarily be endogenous to that practice.
This endogeneity means that the foregoing assessment of the opportunity
costs of deliberation, as well as their cognitive difficulties, ought ultimately to
be injected directly into the political decision of whether to accept those con-
straints or not.  Fish and others have asserted that members of society whose
comprehensive world views, religiously grounded or otherwise, preclude them
128. This does not mean that law is completely subordinate to politics; law is best described as a
quasi-autonomous practice.  The interpretation and application of law cannot be completely controlled
by the law giver.  Still, a lot of law’s structure resides in the “quasi” part of its quasi-autonomous status,
and much of that content is placed there through the political process.
129. Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds Between Church and State, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 2255, 2298-99 (1997).  While Fish thinks this is a characteristic tendency of liberalism,
Bonnie Honig sees it as a tendency of political theory in general.  BONNIE HONIG, POLITICAL THEORY
AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF POLITICS 3 (1993) (“[m]ost political theories are hostile to the disruptions
of politics and assume that the task of political theory is . . . to get politics . . . over, and done with”).
James Morone finds this desire to domesticate politics present in public attitudes throughout American
history, including especially punctuated periods of political reform, such as the Progressive and New
Deal eras, when hope abounds that reform will put our system of government on automatic pilot.
JAMES MORONE, THE DEMOCRATIC WISH 141 (1990) (“In either [the New Deal or Progressive] tradi-
tion, the ideal was public administration as a mechanistic force rather than as independent judgment . . .
New Deal Keynesianism relied on automatic formulas rather than discretionary ‘political’ choices.  The
impulse is deeply rooted in American political history.  Across the generations of reform, we have seen
the search for automatic politics and the suspicion of public officials who would think for themselves.”).
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from accepting the constraints of deliberation would be justified in rejecting
them.130  The arguments against the demands of deliberation advanced here ap-
peal to a broader audience.  They ought to count even among people who might
otherwise be prepared to accept those constraints.  The appeal of the argument
that a person would be justified in stopping short of total, unyielding devotion
to the deliberative ideal because of its costs and difficulties is one that an oth-
erwise willing deliberator is fully equipped to appreciate.  At no point in the ar-
gument does anything turn on sectarian or nonpublic beliefs, knowledge, or as-
sumptions.
Were a group of citizens ever to gather in a deliberative frame of mind to
consider whether to endorse the demands of deliberation, they ought to refuse
once they came to understand those demands.  A seminar room debate that at-
tends to the fate of deliberation in kitchens, soccer fields, and workplaces ought
to reject deliberation as an unyielding ideal.  Deliberation defeats itself.
Specific deliberative practices in specific contexts may still be urged upon
political actors.  Specific decisions and decisional processes may still be criti-
cized for failing to be sufficiently deliberative.  If the foregoing is correct, how-
ever, the basis of this criticism cannot be the universal claim asserted by delib-
erative theorists that politics ought to be like law.  Because the call completely
to assimilate politics to law fails, it follows that politics continues to be partially
non-deliberative, which means it continues to be influenced by partial interests
but cannot properly be criticized on these grounds alone.
Politics will necessarily be more rough-and-tumble, and less orchestrated
and structured, than the ideal.  Because deliberative theory is motivationally
implausible, individuals involved in politics as practiced will continue to reason
non-deliberatively and decisions will be made through non-deliberative institu-
tions.  There is much more to know about how such reason and institutions op-
erate, as well as about how one influences the other.131  Work that is practically
valuable will be oriented to our better understanding of institutions, reasoning
practices, and how the two interact, and then toward understanding how politi-
cal decision-making might be improved.  In neither case is the legal model going
to provide a good universal ideal against which to judge progress.
IV
POLITICAL DECISIONS, DELIBERATION AND PARTIAL INTERESTS
President Bush’s August 9, 2001, stem cell decision came after a process that
included many elements deliberativists ought to applaud.  In his prime-time ad-
dress announcing the decision, President Bush said that he had consulted with
“scientists, scholars, bio-ethicists, religious leaders, doctors, researchers, Mem-
130. See Fish, supra note 129, at 2287-93.
131. See, e.g., ELEMENTS OF REASON: COGNITION, CHOICE AND THE BOUNDS OF RATIONALITY
(Arthur Lupia et al. eds., 2000).
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bers of Congress, my Cabinet, and my friends.”132  With the possible exception
of the religious leaders—about whom more will be said in a moment—this is a
group of discussants that any deliberativist should approve.  The prime-time
address itself constituted a reasoned and articulated announcement and defense
of the decision.  The President, in effect, acknowledged the demands of reiter-
ated deliberation by establishing a President’s Council to “monitor stem cell re-
search, to recommend appropriate guidelines and regulations, and to consider
all of the medical and ethical ramifications of biomedical research.”133  Based on
these visible aspects of the stem cell decision-making process, deliberativists
ought to be well disposed toward the President’s decision.
Less visible aspects of the process may also have had attractive deliberative
attributes.  Of course, we cannot know the internal thought process the Presi-
dent employed in reaching his final judgment, but the result itself can be seen as
the product of an effort to accommodate two irreconcilable positions based on
mutual respect, just as deliberativists would urge.134  One position asserted that
embryonic stem cell research ought to be completely prohibited because it pro-
duces incentives for embryos to be created for the purpose of farming their
stem cells, which destroys the embryo.  The other side advocated that such re-
search holds the key to many significant medical breakthroughs and thus ought
to be encouraged.  President Bush made a decision that ignores neither side and
his explanation treats both sides with respect.  He decided that the government
would fund research on embryonic stem cells, thereby providing for the possi-
bility of medical breakthroughs based on such research, but only if the stem cell
lines involved in that research were already in existence, thereby preventing the
availability of federal monies from becoming an incentive for creation of stem
cell lines from new embryos.135  The stem cell decision thus exhibits a good
number of positive features when viewed in a deliberative light, which was to be
expected by virtue of the fact that in advance of the decision the President and
his advisors had stressed that the President would consult widely and be led by
what science and ethics recommended.136
At the same time, other features of the stem cell decision illustrate how far
from the deliberative ideal actual political decisions are, even when instigated
and carried out under favorable deliberative conditions.  Most prominently, it is
obvious that citizens as a whole did a very poor job deliberating about the con-
troversy, notwithstanding the fact that they seemed to be paying fair attention
to it.137  Few knew the content of the President’s  decision.  Only one in four
132. President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Stem Cell Research from Crawford,
Texas (Aug. 9, 2001), available at 2001 WL 14297878.
133. Id.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 73–74 (discussing Gutmann and Thompson’s injunction of
accommodation based on mutual respect).
135. See Presidential Address, supra note 132.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2.
137. A poll taken in October 2001 found that 51% of those responding had followed the stem cell
story closely.  This compared to 30% who followed closely a federal court decision blocking the Presi-
dent’s plan for prescription drug discount cards; 65% who followed closely stories on the economy and
SCHROEDER_FMT.DOC 08/01/02  1:42 PM
126 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 65: No. 3
were able to identify the key feature of the decision, its limitation on federal
funding to existing stem cell lines only.138  Ignorance about the decision was
coupled with ignorance about the issues involved.  On the eve of the President’s
decision, only a bare majority were able to state the main reason for the stem
cell controversy.139  Confusion about the issues was as evident as ignorance of
them.  Fully 62% stated they agreed with President Bush’s decision to limit fed-
eral support to existing cell lines,140 while 75% of the same survey sample also
approved of “using destroyed embryos discarded from fertility clinics that no
longer need them” for research on disease cures, a practice that the Bush policy
prevents.141  Such was the lack of awareness about a public issue that had re-
ceived fairly prominent news coverage, with nearly 80% of the public saying the
issue was very important or fairly important to them.142
This pattern of responses is quite consistent with a public that was picking
up information about the stem cell issue in a more or less casual way without
sustained engagement with others on the issue.  Still, people who have opinions
on stem cell research must have acquired or developed their opinions in some
fashion.  It turns out that a plurality of those opposed to stem cell research re-
lied upon their religious beliefs in forming those opinions, while only 3% of
those who supported such research said religious beliefs were the most impor-
tant influence on their views.143  Perhaps the approving citizens realized that the
demands of deliberation required them to limit the grounds of their ultimate
decision to publicly accessible reasons, avoiding private religious beliefs, but
this seems quite doubtful.  More likely, those citizens did not base their judg-
ments on their religious beliefs because nothing in those beliefs strongly sup-
ported one outcome or the other.
the shrinking budget surplus; and 95% who followed closely the World Trade Center and Pentagon at-
tacks of September 11, 2001.  Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Health News Interest Index Poll, Oc-
tober 1-5, 2001, available at Westlaw POLL database, question id: USPSRA.01HNIOC R02A - R02I.
138. Twenty-eight percent knew this was part of the decision. Kaiser Poll, supra note 137, at ques-
tion id: USPSRA.01HNIOC R03.
139. Fifty-one percent knew it was because human embryos are destroyed in the research process;
7% believed danger to the adult subjects in research trials was the reason; 9% thought insufficient
money was the reason; and 33% did not know.  Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Health News In-
terest Index Poll, August 2-5, 2001, available at Westlaw POLL database, question id:
USPSRA.01HNIIA RO3.
140. In a Fox News opinion poll, 59% of those surveyed said they approved of the President’s deci-
sion.  Fox News, Opinion Dynamics Poll, August 22-23, 2001, available at Westlaw POLL database,
question id: USODFOX.032401 R12.  A Gallup Poll taken prior to the President’s decision indicated
that 54% of those surveyed believed the federal government should fund research on embryos from
fertility clinics.  Gallup Organization poll, July 10-11, 2001, available at Westlaw POLL database, ques-
tion id: USGALLUP.01JUL10 R20.
141. IPSOS-Reid Poll, August 10-12, 2001, available at Westlaw POLL database, question id:
USIPSOSR.081301 R1, R2.
142. Thirty-six percent responded “very important” and forty-two percent responded “somewhat
important” in a Gallup poll taken just after the President’s decision.  Gallup Organization Poll, August
10-12, 2001, available at Westlaw POLL database, question id: USGALLUP.01AG10 R11.
143. ABC NEWS poll, June 20-24, 2001, available at Westlaw POLL database, question id:
USABC.062601 R3A, R3B.
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Indeed, whatever the other deliberative virtues of the President’s own deci-
sion, avoiding the invocation of religious beliefs was not one of them.  The
President did more than simply consult with religious leaders; he declared that
his own religious beliefs directly “shaped” his final decision.144  This acknowl-
edgment by the President greatly diminishes the deliberative credentials of the
stem cell decision, because it strongly suggests, if not explicitly admits, that a
type of reason that deliberative theory wants to block from determining public
outcomes was in fact material to such an outcome.
At this point, it is clear that the public has a much more positive attitude to-
ward the President’s decision and puts much less stock in the pedigree of the
President’s reasons than a deliberative theorist does.  A survey taken immedi-
ately after the President’s speech probed the public’s opinion as to the Presi-
dent’s reasons for his decision.  Concededly, the survey question tried to force
the responses into one of two choices: respondents were asked whether the
President’s opinion came “mostly because of political reasons or mostly because
of his deeply held beliefs.”145  Neither of these choices is precisely defined, but it
seems reasonable to believe that most of the respondents equated “political
reasons” with electoral considerations.146  “Deeply held beliefs,” on the other
hand, could refer to religious or non-religious based comprehensive views.
Given the choice as thus framed, 52% thought political reasons exerted the
greatest influence, while 36% thought deeply held beliefs did.147  If we allocated
half of the latter response to deeply held religious beliefs, which seems a con-
servative estimate, then 70% of the survey respondents thought the President
acted on reasons deliberative theory wants to disallow from any political influ-
ence.  Notwithstanding, three out of five people approved of the decision.  In-
deed, by one means of reckoning, the decision was a perfect compromise—of
those who disapproved of the decision, 40% thought it wrong because it al-
lowed stem cell research while 46% disapproved because it restricted stem cell
research.148  In short, at least 70% of one survey thought the President’s decision
was predicated on reasons deliberative theory thinks impermissible, and yet the
decision garnered strong majority support and divided dissenters nearly down
the middle.
From a practical perspective, the President’s decision has much to be said
for it, which is what popular reaction seem to affirm.  The decision may need to
be revisited if the restriction to existing stem cell lines proves too confining for
effective medical research, but as a means of managing the issue—which often
proves to be the objective of political decision-making—the decision deserves
144. “My position on these issues is shaped by deeply held beliefs. . . . I . . . believe human life is a
sacred gift from our Creator.” Presidential Address, supra note 132.
145. Gallup Poll, supra note 142, at question id: USGALLUP.01AG10 R12.
146. See infra for a discussion of the widely held understanding of “politics” as referring to strategic
calculations and behavior driven by electoral considerations.
147. Gallup Poll, supra note 142, at question id: USGALLUP.01AG10 R12.
148. Fox News Poll, supra note 140, at question id: USODFOX.032401 R13.
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the positive grade the public has given it notwithstanding the pedigree of its un-
derlying rationale.
The public’s reaction to the stem cell decision puts on the table deliberative
democracy’s core claim that political decisions ought to be made without reli-
ance upon religiously based comprehensive views or the resort to partial inter-
ests.  To conclude this paper, I suggest that deliberative theory claims too much
here, just as it claims too much in asserting that we ought to strive for more and
more law-like deliberation.  Setting as a goal of politics the elimination of such
values, interests, and reasons has the same motivational implausibility as the
goal of engaging in more and more deliberation.  Partial interests and compre-
hensive views can no more be blocked pre-politically than deliberation can be
imposed pre-politically.
It is at least questionable whether the injunction against partial and com-
prehensive views satisfies deliberative theory’s own ideal of mutual respect.
Deliberativists claim that when partial interest advocacy is done openly, it is in-
effective in any event.  Public argument, it is said, necessarily forces one to ar-
ticulate arguments based on public considerations.  One reason that “members
[of an assembly] appear hesitant to bring up self-interest and sometimes express
disapproval when another member does,” is that there is a social norm “that
says that no one should take a position that cannot be justified in terms of the
benefits to the collectivity.”149  A second reason is strategic: “Vote for the bill
because it will make me better off” is not an argument anticipated to pick up
many votes.150  Our own sectarian comprehensive views are similarly not likely
to be convincing to others; our private values do not provide reasons to others
to act.  Open advocacy of partial interest positions, therefore, is going to be
rare.  If that is so, however, and individuals nonetheless want to rely upon such
reasons and views to explain why they support a particular outcome, it must be
because these are their strongest convictions regarding the subject under discus-
sion and they believe it very important to express them.  One way to vindicate
the value of mutual respect is to hear them out.
All in all, though, the problems raised by partial interests and comprehen-
sive views do not tend to arise when they are expressly invoked, but rather
when they operate behind the scenes as the “real” motives of political actors.  A
major source of cynicism toward public decision-making is the widespread be-
lief that individuals advance arguments that they do not believe, depend upon
principles whose implications they do not endorse, and mask the pursuit of self-
interest in hypocritical appeal to public values.151
The conclusion that partial interest is what really drives politics generates a
cynical logic that can be seen everywhere in discourse about public life.  It is the
149. Jon Elster, Deliberation & Constitution Making, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note
20, at 97, 101 (quoting JAMES COLEMAN, THE  FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 393 (1990)).
150. James Fearon, Deliberation as Discussion, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 20, at
44, 54.  The fact that even majorities seem required to justify their actions in public interest terms sug-
gests that the strategic reason does need to be supplemented with the norm-based reason.  Id.
151. JOSEPH N. CAPPELLA & KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, SPIRAL OF CYNICISM 17-37 (1997).
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logic that permits conservatives to attack civil rights and environmental organi-
zations as just another set of special interests, and liberals to do the same with
the National Rifle Association.  It is the logic that enables television anchors,
reporters, and pundits to treat strategy as reality, and policy arguments as veils
to be pierced.  It is the logic whereby both Jim Lehrer and Secretary Thompson
saw immediately that endorsing the president’s stem cell decision as political
would have been a mere confession of what most talking heads believed: “po-
litical” is code for “self-interest,” and of course the decision will be based on
that.152
Deliberative democracy’s requirement of sincerity is designed to block such
posturing by public actors.  Unfortunately, what begins as an attempt to im-
prove politics can end up perpetuating a cynical conception of it because actual
politics will inevitably and justifiably fall far short of the ideal being espoused. It
is undeniable that self-interest motivates the actions of many people in the pub-
lic arena; true profiles in courage are few and far between.  If the presence of a
strong partial interest motivation under a public-interest cellophane wrapper
suffices to disparage a public actor, few can escape disparagement.
Because political action is so resource-consumptive, investment in it is most
likely when the marginal dollar produces gains on both an individual’s private
utility function and her social utility function.  Then the incentives are better
aligned.  The public acts of citizens and public officials thus are often the prod-
uct of mixed motives, when both partial interest and public interest point in the
same direction.  Members of Congress consider it a wonderful thing when ex-
pediency and principle come together.  Both citizens and officials can to a con-
siderable degree exercise control of their agendas.  They will tend to gravitate
toward mixed-motive activities, thereby making political activities more likely.
The public interest benefits from such mixed motives.153  The combination
effect of mixed motives stimulates important public policy.  Supporters of civil
rights, for instance, can applaud the efforts of African-American leaders of the
civil rights movement, even acknowledging that those leaders might have been
significantly motivated by self-interest, because they benefited materially from
the enactment of desirable legislation.154  The cause of protecting the environ-
ment in the early 1970s benefited from a self-interested contest between Rich-
ard Nixon and Edmund Muskie for the environmental vote.155  Tobacco compa-
nies have been successful in blocking legislation creating further regulations for
their product.
Whether these examples of mixed motives appeal to you depends upon your
assessment of the quality of the public policy produced.  Perhaps you think that
152. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
153. For an excellent statement of the benefits of interest group advocacy in American politics, see
Peter H. Schuck, Against (and for) Madison: An Essay in Praise of Factions, 15 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
553 (1997).
154. See Schuck, supra note 153, at 553.
155. E. Donald Elliot et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Envi-
ronmental Law, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 313 (1985).
SCHROEDER_FMT.DOC 08/01/02  1:42 PM
130 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 65: No. 3
the civil rights movement has produced undesirable public preference programs
for minority enterprise, or in college admissions, or that the environmental leg-
islation passed in the competition between Nixon and Muskie was excessively
expensive and in other ways unwise, or that it is poor public policy to continue
to permit tobacco sales without further regulation.  If these are your attitudes,
you are much more likely to focus on the partial interest dimensions of the cor-
responding political decision.  Indeed, think of your own examples of when par-
tial interests seem to have controlled a political outcome and I believe you will
find yourself bringing to mind examples of cases in which you disapproved of
the policy result.  The partial interest influence seems much more benign—it
may even entirely recede from our view—when you support the policy result.
Public policy dynamics have this chameleon-like character precisely because
there are mixed motives involved in almost all public policy, so that you can al-
most always identify a group or individuals with partial interests on the winning
side.  The chameleon’s color changes not because partial interest motives are
uniformly objectionable, but rather because the policy context and result have
changed.  We react to an outcome we find unattractive and then look for the
guilty party.
Deliberativists may say they have no difficulty with mixed motives so long as
the public interest rationale offered is sincere and reflects a commitment to its
general application in other circumstances.  Even this, however, is a heroically
stringent demand to place on all political actors.  Very few of us have fully
worked out comprehensive views such that we can honestly stipulate to the
general application of every principle we advance.  Public policy issues can in-
voke the application to specific decisions of many difficult high-order concepts,
such as freedom, equality, security, justice, and autonomy.  Even those who
hold to well-developed and widely held ideologies, such as liberalism or neo-
conservatism, may resist such a stipulation.  Liberalism and neoconservatism, as
well as many other ideologies, cannot claim the perfect consistency required to
commit to the generality standard.156
Furthermore, working out at a personal level views that satisfy the delibera-
tive requirement of sincerity is another resource-consumptive step that indi-
viduals are unlikely to take.  This does not mean that people are insincere, only
that they have not yet attended to a more careful development of their views.
Illustratively, Dennis Chong has found that people can express unqualified sup-
port for rights that reflect tolerance, such as an unqualified right of free speech,
and subsequently also support denying individuals and groups those rights.157
This need not be an indication of insincere convictions, however.  It could be
that these answers reflect a consistently held commitment to a weak right, one
156. MELVIN J. HINICH & MICHAEL C. MUNGER, IDEOLOGY AND THE THEORY OF POLITICAL
CHOICE 15 (1996) (citing ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE
GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1987)).
157. GEORGE KLOSKO, DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURES AND LIBERAL CONSENSUS 54 (2000) (sum-
marizing Dennis Chong, How People Think, Reason and Feel About Rights and Liberties, 37 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 867-99 (1993)).
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subject more easily to qualifications than a strong one.158  You might be able to
tell which view an individual holds only after the fact, after she has been con-
fronted with situations requiring subtle choices to be made.
There are circumstances in which even the bald assertions of partial inter-
ests seem justified.  Suppose that after participating in a deliberative process
you sincerely become convinced that one action is preferable to another, all
things considered, under appropriate deliberative conditions.  Nonetheless, the
question is a close one because the causal relationship between the policy being
proposed and the desired end result is poorly understood or subject to change
by intervening events.  It is also a policy whose heavy costs will be predomi-
nantly borne by you.  You object to the policy on the grounds that you are un-
willing to bear those costs to achieve a possible, but somewhat speculative,
public result.  Would deliberative democracy deny the legitimacy of your voting
“no” on the proposal on the basis of its heavily disproportionate impact on you?
Here, too, deliberative democracy might contend that resistance to such de-
cisions is consistent with the demands of deliberation.  Your objection, a delib-
erative theorist might say, could be understood as acceptably reasoned, by
treating it as an assertion that the policy is unfair to you, and then acknowledg-
ing that unfairness of this kind can be part of a comprehensive view that mutu-
ally committed individuals could find acceptable.  Therefore, what might seem
like an impermissible partial interest reason can be translated into an accept-
able public reason.
This kind of reply risks injecting into deliberative democracy the kind of
tautological quality to which rational-actor models are susceptible.  Rational-
actor models can attempt to explain behavior that runs counter to self-interest
narrowly construed by adding additional arguments to the individual’s utility
function.  For example, voting becomes rationally understandable because peo-
ple experience pleasure from performing a civic duty.  The counterpart tautol-
ogy for deliberative democracy is to treat private-interest reasons as reasons
predicated on a conception of fairness that makes objecting to the cost distribu-
tion of a policy a public reason.  It is doubtful that deliberativists would want to
make this move.  If deliberative theorists did, however, then they ought also to
be candid in acknowledging the legitimate role that private reasons can play in
their conception of democracy.
V
CONCLUSION
If deliberativists would concede that public acts can justifiably rest on mixed
motives, that they can be justified by claims that partial interests are being un-
fairly treated, that no fully worked out general theory of fairness needs to be
available to those actors, and that non-deliberative modes of decision-making
and reasoning are necessary parts of political life, all that would be left for me
158. Id. at 58 (developing the idea of weak and strong rights).
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to quarrel with is their rhetoric’s unintended complicity in the downward spiral
of cynicism toward government.  Then again, if they would concede all this,
they would perforce stop painting such an implausible picture of what politics
might be, and they would stop borrowing from the model of law.  They could
then turn their attention to constructive pursuits.
